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REFINING REGULATION: THE OIL REFINERY REGULATORY
FRAMEWORK AFTER THE ENERGY POLICY ACT OF 2005
Christopher J. Koschnitzky*
INTRODUCTION
The devastation of oil refinery infrastructure along the Gulf Coast
caused by Hurricane Katrina in August 2005' and Hurricane Rita in
September 20052 shut down 5.6 million barrels of domestic refinery
capacity per day (mb/d), or almost one-third of the U.S.'s total capacity.3
As a result, the price of gasoline and other refined products spiked to
reflect the tightened domestic supply. The national average price for
gasoline increased $1.04 to $2.95 per gallon in September of 2005.4 High
gasoline prices, however, did not dissipate once most of the refinery
infrastructure came back online. By September 2006, one year after the
Hurricanes5 hit, the national price for gasoline only fell $0.34 from the
post-Hurricane price spike to $2.61.6 With the public's attention on the
retail price of refined products after two years of sustained higher prices,
coupled with media reports about the nation's refinery capacity,7
* J.D. Candidate, 2008, Indiana University School of Law-Indianapolis; B.A. 2005,
Wake Forest University, Winston-Salem, North Carolina. The author wishes to thank
Professor Daniel H. Cole for his comments and suggestions.
See Jeff D. Opdyke & Kris Hudson, Hurricane Cuts Destructive Path Along Gulf Coast,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 30, 2005, at Al.
2 See Simon Romero & Vikas Bajaj, Refineries Escape Major Damage, but Gas Price
May Still Rise, N.Y. TIMES., Sept. 24, 2005, at 34; see also Chip Cummins & Bhushan
Bahree, Gulf Coast: Why the World is One Storm Away from an Energy Crisis, WALL ST.
J., Sept. 24, 2005, at Al.
3 LAWRENCE KUMINS & ROBERT BAMBERGER, CRS REPORT RL33124, OR AND GAS
DISRUPTION FROM HURRICANES KATRINA AND RITA 3 (2006), available at
http://www.ncseonline.org/NLE/CRSreports/06May/RL33124.pdf.
4 ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION ("EIA"), U.S. GASOLINE AND DIESEL RETAIL
PRICES (2006), http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/xls/pet_prignd~dcus nusm.xls.
5 Hereinafter, "Hurricanes" refers collectively to Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Rita.
6 EIA, supra note 4. 4.
7 See, e.g., Beth Heinsohn, Refined Reasons, WALL ST. J., Oct. 16, 2006, at R9 ("Many
U.S. refiners were unable to meet demand without resorting to larger than usual imports
after hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005. The storms temporarily shut down 24 Gulf
Mo. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REv., Vol. 15, No. I
legislators hoping to capitalize on the media and public attention to the
refinery capacity situation introduced a host of legislative proposals with
the aim to increase domestic capacity. The proposed legislation would
amend the "comprehensive" Energy Policy Act of 2005 ("EPAct") passed
just weeks before the Hurricanes hit. 9
The EPAct is the most recent legislation enacted that addresses the
nation's refinery capacity.10 Based on the host of legislation proposed
after the EPAct was enacted that sought to encourage refinery expansion,
legislators indicated that they viewed current domestic refinery capacity as
inadequate despite measures in the EPAct aimed to promote such capacity.
" Some proposals more limited in scope sought only to make federally
owned land more accessible for refining infrastructure,12 while other more
dynamic legislation called for the "streamlining" of the overall regulatory
permitting process for refineries.13
As this Note discusses, the effect of the regulatory framework is
only one of several factors that affects the nation's domestic refinery
capacity. Still, the role of the regulatory framework is significant. If
legislators hope to encourage increases in domestic refinery capacity, then
a regulatory scheme that focuses on national objectives should be
implemented. This can be accomplished by designating the Department of
Energy ("DOE") as the lead federal agency in charge of domestic refinery
Coast refineries, one-third of total U.S. oil-processing capacity . . . the disaster focused
public attention on the longer-term capacity issue, and pushed the matter at the top of the
political agenda."); Mark Clayton, A Push to Build New U.S. Refineries, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Sept. 21, 2005, at 11.
8 See discussion infra Part III.B.
9 Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (2005). The EPAct was
enacted on August 8, 2005.
'0 See id. § 391, 119 Stat. 748 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 15951) (2006)) (stating that (1) "it
serves the national interest to increase petroleum refining capacity . .. (2) [U.S.] demand
for refined petroleum products currently exceeds the country's petroleum refining
capacity to produce such products, [and] (3) this excess demand has been met with
increased imports . . .").
1 See discussion infra Part II.B.
12 See, e.g., Gasoline for America's Security Act of 2005, H.R. 3893, 109th Cong. §
101(b)(1)(G) (2005).
13 See, e.g., Refinery Permit Process Schedule Act, H.R. 5254, 109th Cong. § 4, 7 (2005);




capacity. Thus, when the other relevant factors that affect domestic
refinery capacity (e.g., the availability of capital and demand for refined
products) favor capacity expansion, the unintended effects of disjointed
regulation will not hinder the development for refinery capacity
expansion. Recent legislative proposals that are limited in scope are
unlikely to have a meaningful effect on refinery capacity growth, and will
likely simply add to the complexity of the current decentralized regulatory
scheme. In addition, the proposals that are limited in scope may simply be
detrimental to other legislative goals, such as promoting a clean
environment. To understand how the regulatory framework affects the
industry, one must consider how domestic refinery capacity arrived at its
current state, and how recent legislation attempts to address the refinery
regulatory framework. The wide range of legislative proposals
demonstrates a lack of consensus on what has caused the current refinery
capacity situation, and how to properly address the situation. Bringing
refinery construction and expansion under the DOE's authority is a modest
step that will inject the national prerogative in having adequate
infrastructure further other national goals, such as the implementation of a
federal fuels program as a means to achieve environmental goals. I
This Note will evaluate the current regulatory framework and how
proposed legislation may affect that framework. Part I outlines a brief
history of domestic refinery capacity to the present. In addition, Part I
examines the likely future of domestic refinery capacity under the status
quo. Part II addresses how the evolving legal framework of environmental
and land acquisition requirements among the local, state, and national
level has resulted in a patchwork system of regulations that do not
represent a cohesive national regulatory scheme for the refinery industry.
Part III explains and analyzes how the EPAct and recent legislation
attempt to address refinery capacity growth. Finally, Part IV proposes that
the DOE should become the lead federal agency in charge of permitting
and coordinating refinery expansion efforts so that the national interest in
having adequate refinery capacity is property weighed as an important
consideration when private and public parties made decisions affecting
refinery capacity.
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I. RECENT REFINERY INDUSTRY HISTORY
A. A Gradual Shift in Refining Capacity Utilization
As of January 1, 2006, the United States had 142 operating oil
refineries and seven idle refineries, with a total capacity of approximately
17.3 mb/d.14 Idle capacity of 1.1mb/d largely represented capacity taken
offline by the Hurricanes that had not been restored by January 1, 2006.15
Approximately 8.2 of the 17.3 mb/d, a little less than half of the nation's
capacity, is refined in the Petroleum Administration for Defense District
("PADD") 111.16 PADD III includes the Gulf Coast states Alabama,
Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, New Mexico, and Texas.' 7 Because of
the regional allocation of the nation's refineries, the Hurricanes posed a
formidable threat to the U.S.'s overall refinery capacity.' 8 Domestic
refineries were operating at ninety-seven percent of capacity on the eve of
Hurricane Katrina, which is akin to recent utilization usage rates.19
14 EIA, REFINERY CAPACITY REPORT 2006 1 (2006),
http://www.eia.doe.gov/pub/oilgas/petroleum/datapublications/refinery capacitydatal
current/refcap06.pdf.
"s Id. at 1 n.a.6 Id. at 1. PADDs were delineated during World War II to facilitate regional oil
allocation. EIA, OIL MARKET BASICS app.A (2004),
http://www.eia.doe.gov/pub/oilgas/petroleum/analysis_publications/oilmarketbasics/f
ullcontents.htm. Often, national energy policy decisions are implemented on a regional
basis by PADD district. See, e.g., ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY ("EPA"),
FUEL WAIVER RESPONSES TO 2005 HURRICANES (2006),
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/katrina/waiver/index.html (stating that the EPA issued
fuel requirement waivers according to PADD district). For a discussion of fuel
requirement waivers, see discussion infraPart II.E.
17 EIA, supra note 14, at 1.
18 See Alastair Walling, Exposed Refineries, Price-Gouging, and the Gas Crisis that
Never Was, 20 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 55, 55 (Spring 2006) ("Katrina's path
threatened six of the nation's eleven largest refineries. In all, 8 million barrels of refining
capacity, or 47 percent of U.S. production, lay at Katrina's mercy.").
1 PETROLEUM INDUSTRY RESEARCH FOUNDATION ("PIRINC"), LESSONS FROM THE
HURRICANES 2 (2005), http://www.eprinc.org/download/hurricanes.pdf. "The Energy
Policy Research Foundation, Inc. ("EPRINC"), formerly PRINC ... is a not-for-profit
organization that studies energy economics with special emphasis on oil .. . EPRINC
briefs government officials, including the State Department, the [DOE], and the Federal
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Because the United States did not have excess refinery capacity outside of
PADD III following the effects of the Hurricanes, unmet demand
following the Hurricanes was met by imports. 20 Imports continue to offset
unmet demand for refined products. 2 1 The configuration of the nation's
refinery infrastructure has not changed since before the Hurricanes hit, and
there remains the possibility that any similar future disruption to Gulf
Coast refinery capacity will leave the United States more dependant on
foreign sources of refined products-foreign sources that may not be
compatible with current U.S. refined product regulations.
Current capacity issues can be traced back over thirty years to
1976 when the Marathon Corporation built the last oil refinery in
22Garyville, Louisiana. During early 1982, the United States had 301
operable refineries, producing 17.9 mb/d.23 Thus, although the United
States currently has 152 less operable refineries than it did in 1982, it only
has .5 mb/d less capacity than in 1982. Most of the refineries that closed
were small, inland facilities without water transportation, and almost all
had capacity under 100,000 barrels per day.24 The refineries currently in
operation are generally much larger, which reflects the current business
model of refiners that contemplates taking advantage of economies of
scale.25
Reserve, and legislators. . . ." EPRINC, About Us, http://www.eprinc.org/about.html
(last visited Mar. 4, 2007).
20 KUMINs & BAMBERGER, supra note 3, at 5.
21 EPA & DOE, EPACT SECTION 154 1(c) BOUTIQUE FUELS REPORT TO CONGRESS 17
(2006), available at http://www.epa.gov/oms/boutique/420r06901.pdf.
22 Marathon Oil Corp., Marathon Announces Plans to Increase Garyville Refinery
Capacity, Oct. 27. 2005, available at
http://www.marathon.com/content/includes/PF News Releases.asp?ReleaselD=774046.
23 EIA, Number of Operatable Refineries (2006),
http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/xls/petpnpcap ldcu nus a.xls.24 LAWRENCE KUMINS, ET. AL, PIRINC, REFINING CAPACITY - CHALLENGES AND
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Growth of refinery capacity at existing refineries is referred as
"capacity creep." 26  Capacity creep results when refineries invest in
discovering and eliminating inefficient "bottlenecks" at existing refineries,
or by investing in equipment that allows a refinery to "refine heavier
grades of crude oil and to refine crude with higher levels of sulfur."27 The
added capacity at existing refineries has helped to offset the lost capacity
of smaller refineries that were "not economically feasible, and existed to
collect a variety of government subsidies, mostly associated with oil price
and allocation regulations, which disappeared in 1981." 28
Despite the growth of existing refineries by capacity creep,
refinery capacity utilization in the United States gradually tightened
during the 1990s. The utilization rate, which was eighty-five percent in
1990s, increased to ninety-three percent in 1995, and to ninety-six percent
in 2000.29 There has been speculation that the refining industry colluded
to shutter "excess capacity" during the 1990s to improve what the industry
considered were "dismal" refining margins during the 1980s.3 0 Evidence
of such industry action indicates that during the early 1990s when capacity
utilization was below ninety percent, the industry closed smaller, less
efficient refineries with the goal of shuttering "overcapacity." 3 1 Indicative
of the volatile nature of the industry, any attempt to reduce "overcapacity"
was met with rising demand for refined products throughout the mid and
late 1990s. 32 As refining utilization approached capacity at the end of the
26 EIA, OVERVIEW AND DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL TRENDS FOR PETROLEUM
REFINING ch. 4 (1997),
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/finance/usi&to/downstream/ch4.pdf.27 id.
28 Streamlining Refinery Permitting Process: Hearing on S. 1772 Before the S. Comm.
Environment and Public Works, 109th Cong. at *2 (2005) (statement of Brian Mannix,
Associate Administrator of the Office of Policy, Economics and Innovation at the EPA).
29 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ("FTC"), MIDWEST GASOLINE PRICE INVESTIGATION
(2001), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2001/03/mwgasrpt.htm.
30 See SEN. RON RYDEN, THE OIL INDUSTRY, GAS SUPPLY AND REFINERY CAPACITY:
MORE THAN MEETS THE EYE 1 (2001), available at
http://wyden.senate.gov/legissues/reports/wydenoil-report.pdf. (citing internal industry
documents discussing that low refinery margins will remain absent an increase in demand
or reduction in supply of refinery capacity).
' Id.
32 See FTC supra note 29.
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1990s, the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") warned in June 2000 that
with continued increases in demand for refined products, price spikes for
such products would likely occur in the near future. 33  Because tight
refining capacity has now existed for almost a decade, there continues to
be speculation that the industry is colluding to restrain capacity growth to
retain higher refinery margins.
Speculation that the industry is to blame for tight refinery capacity
has affected how some legislatures view the current refinery situation. For
example, Senator Barbara Boxer of California called for an investigation
of Shell Oil Company in November of 2003 when Shell announced that it
was planning to close its Bakersfield, California, refining facility in 2004.
34 The FTC found that there was no manipulation. 35 Speculation that the
current refinery capacity situation is one intended by the industry was
again manifested following the Hurricanes when Congress requested the
FTC investigate potential noncompetitive practices in the refining
industry. 36 Specifically, the FTC investigated whether the industry had
engaged in long-term collusion to intentionally under invest in refinery
capacity. The final FTC report following the Hurricanes reported that
no uncompetitive behavior among refiners was clearly identifiable.38
However, the FTC observed that "[c]onsumers ... are frustrated to be told
that no laws are being broken even as prices increase substantially." 39 The
FTC's observation may explain the political impetus for legislators to call
repeatedly for investigations of collusive behavior. Of course, the refinery
industry does not always operate according to the best interests of refined
33 See FTC supra note 29.
34 Boxer Pleased FTC Investigating Closure Of Shell Oil Bakersfield Refinery, July 8,
2004, available at http://boxer.senate.gov/news/releases/record.cfm?id=223692&&.
3 In Re: Shell Oil Co., FTC File No. 041-0087 (2005), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0410087/050525stmnt0410087.pdf. Ultimately, Shell sold
the refinery to Big West, LLC, of California, a wholly owned subsidiary of Flying J, Inc.
Id. As of January 1, 2006, the Bakersfield refinery was running at capacity, producing
66,000 barrels of refined product per day. EIA, supra note 14, at 5 tbl.3.
36 FTC, INVESTIGATION OF GASOLINE PRICE MANIPULATION AND POST-KATRINA
GASOLINE PRICE INCREASES i (2006), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/060518PublicGasolinePriceslnvestigationReportFinal.pdf
" Id. at 15-17, 20.
3 1 Id. at 154.
3 9 Id. at 198.
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product consumers: The industry has been found to manipulate local
markets for local refiners' advantages in at least two instances.40
However, local refineries have only had the ability to exert regional
market power because of the segmentation of markets for refined products
that has resulted from a patchwork of gasoline and diesel regulation.4'
Currently, the only bona fide attempt to build a domestic refinery
is the Arizona Clean Fuels project ("ACF project") outside Yuma,
Arizona. The ACF project is planned as a $2.5 billion refinery complex
with a projected output of 150,000 barrels of refined product per day. 42
Planning for the facility started in 1989.43 To date, the project has yet to
break ground.44 A necessary permit application for the ACF project was
submitted to the Arizona Department of Environment Quality in 1999, and
the Final Permit was issued in 2005.45 However, the issue of the "Final
Permit," only allows other permitting processes and administrative actions
to move forward.46  The ACF project still requires the issuance of a
multitude of additional permits. For better or worse, the turmoil and
pitfalls of the ACF project is the only recent example that allows for an
assessment of the efficiency and scope of the current regulatory climate on
domestic refinery construction.
40 See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Environmental Regulation, Energy, and Market Entry, 15
DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 167, 171 (Spring 2005).
41 See id.
42 New Refinery Project Permitting Considerations and issues: Hearing on H.R. 5254
Before the S. Comm. Energy and Natural Resources, 109th Cong. at *3 (2006) (statement
of Glenn McGinnis, Chief Executive Officer, Arizona Clean Fuels Yuma LLC); see
generally, The Arizona Clean Fuels Refinery,
http://www.arizonacleanfuels.com/refinery.htm (last visited Feb. 2, 2007).
43 Walling, supra note 18, at 56.
4 Id.
45 McGinnis, supra note 42.
46 The permitting process and administrative approval process is still underway for the
ACF project. Recently the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation has released a final
environmental impact statement that was necessary for the ACF project to move forward.
Joyce Lobeck, "Refinery Moves One Step Closer," THE YUMA SUN, Jan. 9, 2007,
available at http://www.yumasun.com/google/ysarchive25860.html.
47 McGinnis, supra note 42.
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The domestic de facto moratorium on new refinery construction
48does not reflect the international trend of refinery capacity expansion.
Following increasing foreign demand for refined products in favorable
regulatory climates, the refinery industry has focused on building
refineries abroad, such as in India.4 9  However, even with increasing
foreign capacity, the United States is still home to approximately one
quarter of total global refining capacity.50 Despite having a sizable share
of global refining capacity, some legislators dissatisfied with the
industry's response to the supply shock following the Hurricanes have
called for different measures to facilitate the construction of additional
domestic refinery capacity.
B. Post-Hurricane Political Climate
Although the flood of proposed legislation aimed to address
refinery capacity indicated political support for such measures following
the Hurricanes, there has been little consensus on what legislative solution
will promote capacity growth.5 ' Some lawmakers continue to assert that
the refinery industry has not sufficiently invested in capacity growth to
incite tight capacity. 52  These assertions continue despite the fact that
refinery investment, "although down from its recent peak of 1991-1992,
has remained at historically high levels."53 In all, politicians of "all
48 See, e.g., Steve Levine and Patrick Barta, Giant New Oil Refinery in India Shows
Forces Roiling Industry, WALL ST. J., Aug. 29, 2006, at Al (stating that the industry has
"turned away from building new refineries in the U.S. because the numbers work better




50 EIA, supra note 16, at Simple Distillation.
5 See discussion infra Part III.B.
52 152 CONG. REC. E73, 1106 (2006) (statement of Rep. Schakowsky) ("The oil industry
is responsible for limiting refinery capacity. During the 1990s, the American Petroleum
Institute encouraged the oil industry to limit refining capacity in order to boost profits.
The industry followed instructions closing 176 refineries since 1980 and failing [sic] to
fully utilize available capacity.").
5 EIA, THE U.S. PETROLEUM REFINING AND MARKETING INDUSTRY (2004),
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/finance/usi&to/downstream/ch4.html.
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stripes" have sponsored and voted on legislation that has reflected
divergent views on what may have caused the current refinery capacity
situation. 54 Accordingly, no refinery legislation passed both the House of
Representatives and the Senate during the 109th Congress.
With the recent shift of political control from the Republicans to
the Democrats in the 110th Congress, it is not any clearer how Congress
will legislate concerning refinery capacity.5 5  Irrespective of one's
political party, legislators must recognize that unmet demand for refined
products must be met by imports. This situation seems contrary to the
stated aims of both Democrats and Republicans, who both profess that the
United States "should rely less on foreign energy sources."5 6  Thus, it
appears that despite the inevitable political pressures that often results in
energy policy gridlock, this may be a favorable environment that could
lead to the enactment of legislation to address refinery capacity.
If Congressional votes on refinery legislation from the 109th
Congress are an indication, any solution must be substantially different
from past proposals that have mostly been strictly voted on a party line.
54 Although another approach to address refinery capacity growth is to focus on demand-
side issues, demand-side analysis is outside the scope of the this Note. This Note
presumes that "[e]ven with maximum feasible growth of petroleum alternatives and
ardent conservation, oil and natural gas will dominate the energy market for many years."
Politics and Energy Choice, OIL & GAS J., Aug. 14, 2006, at 17.
ss See Nick Snow, Elections Jostle the Outlook for U.S. Energy Issues, OIL & GAS J.,
Nov. 20, 2006, at 24; see also Petroleum Refineries: Will Record Profits Spur Investment
in New Capacity?: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Energy and Resources., Comm.
on Government Reform, 109th Cong. 44 (2005) (statement of Paul Sankey, lead oil
stock analyst at Deutsche Bank) ("[T]he way that problems are addressed on
the Republican side tends to be supply side solutions; which arguably, are
going to make your problems worse.. . . The Democrat side .. . suggests
over-complicated solutions that harken back to ... the bad days of 1979-
1980, when a complex series of regulations were imposed and only came into
effect just as oil prices hit $10 a barrel and were incredibly low.').
56 See Levine, supra note 48 ("Politicians of all stripes say the U.S. should rely less on
foreign energy sources. Instead, it has twin addictions-not only to imported crude to
feed its refineries, but to imported gasoline to meet demand beyond what those refineries
can make.").
5 See, e.g., the vote for the Gasoline for America's Security Act of 2005, H.R. 3893,
109th Cong. (2005). Ninety-four percent of Republicans voted for the bill, while one
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Any solution that has any remote chance of being politically viable must
recognize the complexity of the regulatory environment that governs the
refinery industry, and it must be sensitive to a wide range of interests that
are invariably affected by the refinery industry. If a politically viable
solution is proposed during the current environment when the public is
concerned about the prices of refined products, and thus domestic refinery
capacity, it may have a chance to affect positive changes to the refinery
regulatory framework. This current situation provides a window of
opportunity for change in how the refinery industry is regulated-albeit, a
small window.58
C. Future Refinery Capacity under the Status Quo Regulatory
Environment
If the window of opportunity for regulatory change closes without
any legislative action, then capacity creep advancements are unlikely to
increase total refinery capacity anymore than
ten to fifteen percent at existing facilities. 59 Regardless, it does not appear
that the industry will be able to meet domestic demand solely by
increasing capacity at existing facilities. Except for the unlikely event that
the United States dramatically reduces its consumption of refined products
in the next few years, 60 the current refinery capacity situation means that
the trend of increasing fuel imports will continue. Since 2000, "U.S.
gasoline imports have increased 71 percent or about 500,000 barrels/day,
to average almost 1.1 mb/d in 2005."61 Most imported gasoline supplies
the East Coast, where imports account for approximately twenty five
hundred percent of Democrats voted in opposition.
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h109-3893 (last visited Mar. 5, 2007).58 See ROBERT BAMBERGER, CRS REPORT RL31720, ENERGY POLICY: CONCEPTUAL
FRAMEWORK AND CONTINUING ISSUES 1, available at
http://www.ncseonline.org/nle/crsreports/06jun/RL31720.pdf ("Because prices are now
expected by some analysts to remain high, the prospect for certain longer-range energy
policies may now be more favorable.").9 D.J. PETERSON & SERGI MAHNOVSKI, NEW FORCES AT WORK IN REFINING 39 (2003).
6 See Politics and Energy Choice, supra note 54.61 EPA & DOE, supra note 21, at 17.
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percent of the regional market. 62 It is uncertain if foreign refiners will be
able to supply increased amounts refined products that meet the U.S.'s
unique fuel requirements. 63 Thus, there is a strong likelihood that either
U.S. fuel requirements will be relaxed to accommodate the specifications
of fuel imports,6 or there will be increased regional price volatility as
supply for specific fuels becomes more erratic. While the government
cannot control the industry's historic return on investment ("ROI") or
other significant factors that may affect refinery capacity investment
decisions, the government can reform the current regulatory framework so
that regulations are implemented in a uniform, effective, and efficient
manner. Without changes to the current refinery capacity situation, the
U.S. will import more refined products. Capacity creep will continue, but
to meet the nation's future demand for cleaner refined products, more
domestic refinery capacity is needed.65
II. REFINERY REGULATION
Because refineries and refined products are highly regulated,
regulation is a key component of the "investment calculus" used to
determine when it is prudent to increase refinery capacity. Although
environmental and energy policies are interwoven, they often are "debated
and decided" without consideration for each other.66 The refinery industry
62 EPA & DOE, supra note 21, at 17.
63 KUMMINS, supra note 24, at 3 ("Imported gasoline that meets U.S. specifications is not
always available from foreign refineries in quantities desired.").
6 See discussion infra Part III.D.
65 PETERSON & MAHNovsKi, supra note 59, at 38 ("Looking forward, the [EIA] projects
demand to grow by 1.7 percent annually to 2025, slightly faster than the pace of growth
in refinery capacity between 1995 and 2001. In contrast with conditions in the past,
though, many refining executives with whom RAND (corporation) met maintained that
the industry had entered a new era and would be less likely in the future to keep up with
demand through either strategic investments or capacity creep.").
6 Impact ofEnvironmental Regulations on Oil Refining: Hearing on the Environmental
Regulatory Framework Affecting Oil Refining and Gasoline Policy Before the S. Comm.
Environment and Public Works, 108th Cong. 49 (2004) (statement of Bob Slaughter,
President, National Petrochemical & Refiners Association and the American Petroleum
Institute) ("There is a very close connection between Federal energy and environmental
policies. Unfortunately, these policies are often debated and decided separately and thus
100
REFINING REGULATION
is one such industry in which there is often tension between the industry
and governmental objectives: "Refiners felt that increased regulatory
uncertainty in recent years had added excessive and unnecessary risk to
their investment calculus and had generated incentives for them to delay
compliance as long as possible." 67
A. Regulation and Refinery Investment
With record high prices on petroleum during the past five years, oil
companies have recently reported record profits. 68 In particular, refiners
have been leading the petroleum industry in terms of profitability, havin
the strongest financial balance sheet out of the entire industry in 2005.6
Some predict that the financial climate is just becoming ripe for increased
industry investment. 70 Time lags between earnings and increased
investment activity are not uncommon in the oil industry.7 1 However,
there is also speculation that even with the recent high profit margin in the
industry, there is no guarantee that the industry will use such capital to
increase refinery capacity. Historically, aspects of the oil business other
than refining have had higher and more predictable profit margins. 72
Investment may remain stagnant if the industry believes that recent
profitability levels reflect an unsustainable spike from the usual
unpredictable and lackluster returns on refining. For example, while the
net refining margin was $2.06 per barrel during 2003, it was only $0.19
per barrel in 2002.73 For the period of 1996-2002, the average net refining
margin was $1.44 per barrel, which was exceptional compared to the
in a vacuum. As a result, positive impacts for one policy area sometimes conflict with or
undermine goals and objectives in the other.") [hereinafter Hearing on the Environmental
Regulatory Framework].67 PETERSON & MAHNOVSKI, supra note 59, at 70.
68 See Levine, supra note 48.69 ROBERT PIROG, CRS REPORT RL3302 1, OIL INDUSTRY PROFITS: ANALYSIS OF RECENT
PERFORMANCE 12 (2005), available at
http://www.ncseonline.org/NLE/CRSreports/05aug/RL33021 .pdf.
70 id.
71 d. at 6.
72 id
" Id. at 13.
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1988-1995 period.74 In terms of ROI, the profitability of U.S. refining
"plunged from a peak of 15 percent in 1988 to an average of only 2
percent in the 1992 to 1995 period."7 5 Because of the high volatility in
returns, "the industry might question whether the current increases in
profitability are the beginning of a new era of profitability, or an upward
aberration that will be reversed with the next market correction."76
Still, refining has currently been a profitable business, and the
industry has the capital available to fund investment in refining capacity
expansion. How the industry uses that capital in terms of refinery siting
depends on (1) the overall project economics, (2) technology choices
available, (3) public acceptance of a new refinery, and (4) permittin
processes that are required to get a new refinery up and running.
Although legislation cannot likely address all of the major factors that
determine refinery investment, it can affect how regulation affects
investment decisions. By focusing on the factor that legislation can
address, political momentum concerning refinery regulation will not be
needlessly expended. The inability to affect all aspects of the refinery
investment calculus is not sufficient justification to maintain a regulatory
scheme that does not promote a national interest in refinery capacity
expansion. Notably, any inhibition in refinery capacity is not an intended
goal of the regulations. In fact, it appears that any suppression of refinery
capacity could ultimately dampen the effectiveness of other national
objectives, such as the effectiveness of environmental regulations.78
B. Environmental Regulation ofRefinery Infrastructure
When considering the affects of regulation on the refining industry,
the most cognizable set of regulations affect refinery infrastructure. What
may be some of the most sophisticated regulations affecting the refining
74 d
7 EIA, THE IMPACT OF ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE COSTS ON U.S. REFINING
PROFITABILITY 1995-2001 2 (2003), available at
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/perfpro/ref pi2/refpi2.pdf
7 6 ROBERT PIROG, CRS REPORT RL33373, OIL INDUSTRY PROFIT REVIEw 2005 16 (2006),
available at http://www.ncseonline.org/NLE/CRSreports/06May/RL33373.pdf.
n McGinnis, supra note 42.
7 8 See discussion infra Part II.D.
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industry, the 1990 Clean Air Act ("CAA") Amendments, required a
significant amount of investment. 9 Compliance with the CAA,so
however, is just one set of many complex regulations that govern
refineries. Since the mid 1970s, refineries have all been affected by a host
of regulations under the Clean Water Act,8 ' the Oil Pollution Act,82 the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 83 the Safe Drinking Water
Act, 84 the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act of 1980 ("Superfund"),85 and the Toxic Substances Control
Act. 86 In addition, new refineries will likely face other regulations with a
multitude of local and state controlling agencies such as that currently
affecting the ACF project. There are also proposals to phase in
additional requirements including a change to New Source Review
("NSR")88 requirements. NSR is a series of regulations implemented
under the CAA that apply whenever a refinery will expand or will undergo
"any physical change . . . which increases the amount of any air pollutant
79 EIA, supra note 75, at 1.
80 Provisions of the CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (2006), et seq., that affect oil refineries, as
listed in Hearing on the Environmental Regulatory Framework, supra note 66, at 55, 60
app.A, include 40 C.F.R. Parts 9, 51-52, 60-61, 63, 70, 72-73, 75-80, and 82.
81 Hearing on the Environmental Regulatory Framework, supra note 66, at 57 (citing
provisions of the Clean Water Act that affect oil refineries); see also 40 C.F.R. Pt. 9, 110,
112, 116-17, 121-25, 129, 131-32, 401, 403, and 419.
82 Hearing on the Environmental Regulatory Framework, supra note 66, at 57 (citing
provisions of the Oil Pollution Act that affect oil refineries); see also 40 C.F.R. Pt. 9, 112,
150, and 154.
83 Hearing on the Environmental Regulatory Framework, supra note 66, at 57 (citing
provisions of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act that affect oil refineries); see
also 40 C.F.R. Pt. 144, 148, 256-57, 260-62, 264-66, 268, 270-71, 279-90.
84 Hearing on the Environmental Regulatory Framework, supra note 66, at 57 (citing
provisions of the Safe Drinking Water Act that affect oil refineries); see also 40 C.F.R.
Pt. 144 and 146.
85 Hearing on the Environmental Regulatory Framework, supra note 66, at 57 (citing
provisions of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act of 1980 that affect oil refineries); see also 40 C.F.R. Pt. 11, 302, 355, 370, and 372.
86 Hearing on the Environmental Regulatory Framework, supra note 66, at 57 (citing
provisions of the Toxic Substances Control Act that affect oil refineries); see also 40
C.F.R. Pt. 702, 704, 710, 712, 716, 720-21, 749, 761, and 763.
87 See discussion infra Part II.C.
88 See EPA, New Source Review ("NSR"), http://www.epa.gov/nsr/info.html (last visited
Mar. 5, 2007) (explaining the types and purposes of NSR permits).
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emitted by such source."8 9 In sum, whenever a refinery is going to
upgrade or change its configuration during the refinery process, it may be
subject to NSR requirements. A cursory overview of the names of the acts
gives indication that the acts likely promote the general welfare by
promoting a cleaner, healthier environment; to refiners, the regulations
have meant a web of permitting requirements.
The affect of environmental regulation on refinery returns on
investment has been notable. Arguably, the 1990 CAA Amendments were
successful in partially internalizing some pollution costs by requiring
refineries to invest in pollution control technologies. Illustratively, the
1990 CAA Amendments required refiners to infuse capital into equipment
to meet environmental standards, which resulted in significant decreases
on refiners' ROI. 90 The Energy Information Administration ("EIA") of
the DOE has reported, "ROI in the refining industry was reduced by 42%
from 1996 to 2001 as a result of [environmental] mandated investment
expenditures." 9 The environmental costs for 1996-2001 actually had less
of an impact than during 1991-1995 during which time ROI decreased
sixty nine percent. 92 Even though the cost of complying with
environmental regulations has been notable, those costs are not necessarily
mutually exclusive of refinery productivity.
Although "environmental regulation is commonly thought to
reduce productivity," in the case of refineries, environmental regulations
of refinery infrastructure may have contributed to capacity creep.93 In a
study of the effects of environmental regulations on the productivity of
refineries in Southern California, there was no evidence that the
implementation of stringent air pollution regulations during the 1980s had
"more than a transitory effect on the productivity" of the refineries." 94
Such information raises the question: Why have all refineries not adopted
cleaner technologies if such technologies would increase refinery
'9 CAA § 111, 42 U.S.C. § 741 1(a)(3) (2006).
9o EIA, supra note 75, at 1.
PIROG, supra note 48, at 15 (citing EIA, supra note 75, at 1-10).92 EIA, supra note 75, at 1.
93 See Eli Berman & Linda T.M. Bui, Environmental Regulation and Productivity:





productivity? One theory to explain such behavior is the "real options"
theory of investment under uncertainty. 95 According to the "real options"
theory, refinery investors may defer investment if they face uncertainty
about the "costs and efficacy of untested abatement technology and about
the requirements of future regulations." 96 Thus, although environmental
regulations could have led to increased refinery capacity in the past, the
overall uncertainty about future regulations diminishes expectations that
additional upgrades will enhance productivity in the future. Although
refinery capacity expansion has not been held hostage to environmental
regulation, there is some indication that the uncertainty of future
environmental regulations can affect investment decisions that could be
environmental beneficial. Regulatory uncertainty may stem from another
area of regulation that has been far less predictable-the regulation of
gasoline and diesel fuels. Altogether, regulations of the refineries and
refined products may have a cumulative effect that has been a factor
inhibiting domestic capacity expansion.
C. Environmental Regulation ofRefined Products
In addition to the regulations that directly affect refinery
infrastructure, there is significant regulation on the products refiners
produce-specifically, gasoline and diesel fuels. As of November 2003,
there were eighteen different gasoline formulation mandates for specific
regions of the country. 97 The use of different fuel types stems from the
1990 CAA Amendments, which require the "use of special fuels in areas
that are in nonattainment of the National Ambient Air Quality Standards
("NAAQS") for ozone or carbon monoxide." 98  To meet pollution
standards, states are responsible for developing state implementation plans
("SIP").99 The EPA must approve SIPS.' One tool that states use for
s Id. at 509.
96 id
9 EXXONMOBIL, U.S. GASOLINE REQUIREMENTS (2004),
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2004/04/gaspricesappb.pdf.9 8 BRENT YACOBUCCI, CRS REPORT RL31361,"BOUTIQUE FUELS" AND REFORMULATED
GASOLINE: HARMONIZATION OF FUEL STANDARDS 4 (2006), available at
http://www.ncesonline.org/NLE/CRS/06jun/RL31361.pdf.
9 Berman, supra note 93, at 501.
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SIPs include mandating specific formulation of gasoline known as
"boutique fuels."' 0'
Prior to the 1990 CAA Amendments, gasoline was sold in the
standard regular, mid-grade, and premium variety, and there were gasoline
volatility distinctions between those sold in the northern United States
from the southern United States.102 In addition, a gasoline's "tendency to
evaporate, as measured by Reid Vapor Pressure ("RVP"), shifted between
summer and winter seasons for drivability and control over evaporative
emissions that lead to ozone pollution."' 03 In brief, based on a variety of
environmental considerations, the federally mandated formulations of
gasoline went from simple to complex after the 1990 CAA amendments.
As states mandated unique formulations for gasolines as part of
their SIPs, they invariably added another layer of regulation onto refiners.
States mandated different formulations of gasolines to attain the same
goal: Cleaner air. However, how each state saw it best fit to achieve the
goal of cleaner air varied widely. Some states mandate limitations on the
use of certain fuel additives (MTBE),104 others require certain additives
(ethanol), 1os and some states mandate certain fuel sulfur content. o6
Because each unique fuel is formulated to certain specifications, the
different blends cannot be produced or distributed through similar
100 Berman, supra note 93, at 501.
1o1 EIA, GASOLINE TYPE PROLIFERATION AND PRICE VOLATILITY (2002),
tonto.eia.doe.gov/FTPROOT/service/question8.pdf
102 id
103 Id. at 2.
0 EIA, ELIMINATING MTBE IN GASOLINE IN 2006 (2006),
http://www.tonto.eia.doe.gov/FTPROOT/features/mtbe2OO6.pdf (explaining refiners'
decision to eliminate MTBE because of state bans due to water contamination concerns,
among other reasons). The EPAct repealed the CAA requirement to use MTBE or other
oxygenate, which increase the oxygen content of gasoline, and established a "renewable
fuel standard ('RFS')." YACOBUCCI, supra note 98, at 8. A common RFS is ethanol. Id.los Ethanol requirements have been mandated by on an ad-hoc state by state basis. As of
December 2006, seven states have mandated the use of ethanol in their gasolines, while
legislation requiring minimum ethanol contents were pending in ten states. EPA & DOE,
supra note 21, at app.A. Such requirement was proposed by the Governor of Virginia
and rejected by the Virginia legislature, and a proposal by the Colorado legislature was
vetoed by the Governor of Colorado. Id.
106 YACOBUCCI, supra note 98, at 8.
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channels that may mix the fuel blends. 0 7  Despite the seemingly
significant logistical problems that could arise under such a segregated and
differentiated fuel market, the EPA and state authorities have found that in
the past decade, boutique fuels "have provided significant, cost-effective
air quality improvements."' 0 8 These finding support the continuing use of
boutique fuels, which may explain why the number of gasolines boomed
from three basic grades in 1990 to eighteen in 2005.
Although boutique fuels have contributed to cleaner air than
conventional fuels, the implantation of the boutique fuel system as a whole
is not the intended consequence of any coherent national energy or
environmental policy. As the recent example indicates, the proliferation
of fuel types has fragmented the retail market for gasoline: "[I]n the
summer, fuel produced for the Charlotte, [North Carolina] area cannot be
used in Norfolk, [Virginia] or Atlanta, [Georgia]. However, fuel from
either Norfolk or Atlanta could be shipped to Charlotte." 09  This
patchwork system of fuel regulation will likely lead to disruption in
regional markets when supplies for a specific boutique fuel tighten.
The fragmentation of fuel types was cited as a significant reason
that led to price spikes in the Midwest in the summer of 2000.110 Five
years later, the fragmentation of fuel types was again cited as a factor
contributing to price spikes following the Hurricanes."' As the number of
boutique fuels grow,"l 2 it will become increasingly difficult for refiners to
justify significant capital expenditures to meet certain regional
environmental requirements, only for those requirements to change before
refiners recoup their investment capital. Boutique fuels often require
sophisticated changes in the refining process through, specialized
107 Pierce, supra note 40, at 169.
108 EPA, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT: TASK FORCE ON BOUTIQUE FUELS 3 (2006),
available at http://www.epa.gov/oms/boutique/resources/bftf62306fmalreport.pdf.
'0 YACOBUCCI, supra note 98, at 10.
110 YACOBUCCI, supra note 98, at 8.
11" Id.
112 EIA, supra note 101, at 3 ("Over the next few years, both existing and proposed
regulations will likely increase the number of fuels."); see also Pierce, supra note 40, at
169.
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equipment. 113 In addition to meeting the requirements for boutique fuels,
the refining industry has had to invest in technology that would allow it
expand its capability to produce low sulfur diesel fuels.114
Many states initially mandated what was thought to be the cheapest
fuel that would lead to NAAQS compliance. For example, some states
choose to mandate low-RVP type gasolines as part of their SIPS, as
opposed to adopting the federal standard gasoline reformulated gasoline
("RFG")." 5  Generally, low-RVP gasoline is less costly to produce than
RFG.11 6 The decision of states to mandate what has seemed to be the
cheapest fuel to produce may reflect why the cost of producing boutique
fuels is considered minimal. In fact, it has been calculated that boutique
fuels only cost three cents per gallon more than conventional gasolines." 7
However, this calculation only reflects the added cost of producing a
boutique fuel. Accordingly, the low cost of three cents per gallon is of no
comfort to those who must plan to keep boutique fuels segregated through
the production and distribution stages of delivering the fuels to retail
outlets. Three cents per gallon also does not reflect the retail
differentiation of prices paid for each boutique fuel. Thus, prices for
boutique fuels that "have become increasinglyvolatile since 2000"' 1 do
not reflect a steady-state three cent per gallon premium to regular gasoline.
While three cents per gallon is a small cost to pay for the benefits from
these fuels, the proliferation of such fuels may have contributed to the
reluctance of some refiners to make further expenditures in order to refine
a new type of fuel, only to have a new fuel mandate additional refining
requirements.
13
1 EIA,supra note 101, at 3 ("The two fuel types that have experienced the most
volatility are California RFG ("CaRFG") and Chicago-Milwaukee's ethanol-blended
RFG. These two fuels are unique and difficult to make. Not many refiners outside of
those supplying these areas can regularly make these fuels.").
114 PIROG, supra note 76, at 15.
" Id.
116id.
117 EIA, supra note 101. Calculations for the cost of boutique fuels have ranged from .3
cents to 3 cents in other reports. See EPA, supra note 108, at 6. However, there is not
always agreement on exactly what fuels qualify as "boutique" for the purpose of this
calculation. Id. at 21.
8 Pierce, supra note 40, at 168 (citing EIA, supra note 101, at 4-7).
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Because states likely only considered the effect of its sole fuel
mandate on the national fuel production and distribution system, those
states "inadvertently traded potential production cost savings for
distribution system strain."l 19 When a mandated boutique fuel is in short
supply, "[r]egions with specialized gasolines cannot borrow from their
neighbors if they run short without a special waiver, and with a limited
number of suppliers for a specialized fuel, supply response may take
several weeks."120 Such distribution system strain, which is premised on
production system strain, leads to higher prices for consumers when a
demand is not adequately met. Thus, the states' actions in choosing the
lowest cost fuel to produce sometimes leads to periods where consumers
must pay significantly more for the fuel deemed the "lowest cost" in
production terms.
In effect, when additional fuel types have been mandated by either
federal or state regulations, there have been unintended consequences that
may not be factored into the decisions to impose such requirements.
Although one might expect a profit seeking firm to create market power
by segmenting a national market for a fungible good into local markets, it
seems contrary to the government's mission to create such result. By
creating such localized markets, the government has conferred market
power onto regional and local refineries-which is precisely opposite of
the government's intention as indicated by the numerous requests of the
FTC to investigate refinery anti-competitive behavior.121 In fact, in the
only two cases in which the FTC found anticompetitive behavior by local
refineries, the refineries' actions were made possible by the
fragmentization of fuel types. 22 In one case, a refinery withheld capacity
to increase prices.123 Although this behavior does not violate any antitrust
laws, it is not in the interest of consumers. In the second case, the FTC
alleged that a firm "used false and misleading statements to induce a
government body to issue regulatory standards that conferred market
"9 EIA, supra note 101, at 4.
I120 id.
121 See, e.g., Boxer Pleased FTC Investigating Closure ofShell Oil Bakersfield Refinery,
spra note 34.12 See Pierce, supra note 40, at 171.
123 id
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power upon the firm."'124 It was neither the intention of the 1990 CAA
Amendments to confer market power on local refineries, nor to segment
the market for a national fungible good into eighteen distinct markets.
Simply, there has not been a national regulatory scheme to align
environmental goals with the production and distribution capabilities of
the refinery industry.
D. Siting and Permitting Requirements
Because the ACF project is the only currently planned domestic
refinery, it is difficult to ascertain the extent of which siting and permitting
requirements have factored into investment decisions and the industry's
outlook on the construction of new refining facilities. To be sure,
refineries will likely focus on continuing investment for "capacity creep"
in the near term, which is usually more cost effective than would be the
construction of a new refinery. The effects of capacity creep have been
significant: The addition of 1.4 million barrels per day of refining
capacity between 1996 and 2005 is equivalent to adding ten average sized
refineries over that period.125 Capacity creep is likely to continue because
"capacity additions at existing facilities offer a more predictable method to
provide greater supplies of transportation fuels in a reasonable time
frame."l 26  The industry currently estimates that will add 1.8 million
barrels per day by 2010, bringing total domestic capacity to 18.6 mb/d.' 27
However, it is unlikely that the advances in capacity creep through
efficiency enhancement-which arguably was spurred by environmental
regulations-will be the sole solution in the future for matching domestic
supply with demand.128
12 4 Id. (quoting In Re: Union Oil Co., FTC File No. 011 0214, at 1 (July 7, 2004)).
125New Refinery Project Permitting Considerations and Issues: Hearing on H.R. 5254
Before the S. Comm. Energy and Natural Resources, 109th Cong. at *3 (2006)




128 See PETERSON & MAHNovsKI, supra note 59, at 39 (quoting a "technology and
services executive") ("Yes, we can squeeze more capacity out of our existing refineries-
perhaps 10 to 15 percent ... There are still some improvements in reliability technologies
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Parties interested in building a new refinery facility will likely
consider the experience of the ACF project; after all, it is the only notable
refinery project in the last three decades. The ACF project largely
represents the modem notion of what is required to have a profitable
refinery. Refiners learned from the inefficient and unprofitable ways of
small refineries that were closed in the 1980s.12 9 Thus, today refiners are
"seeking larger sites, with valuable refinery assets, and water-transport
access. . . ." 130 In addition, refiners seek a minimum capacity for
economic scale of 100,000 barrel per day.131 If the ACF project is any
indication of the challenges refiners will face when siting future projects,
then any future siting plans must consider the possibility of derailment that
could occur at the state and local level. Such derailment may occur either
from the inability of a project to weave unilaterally between the
complexities of regulation at the national, state, and local level, or because
of the actions of local opposition groups that use the complexities of
regulation to prevent refinery projects from moving forward. In addition,
a future project would have to be able to consider the risks and delay
inherent to the current permitting process that takes place at the national,
state, and local level.
When siting a proposed refinery, the site must comply with
multiple layers of regulation. For example, the ACF project has to ensure
compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act,1 32 various land
use permits from controlling agencies and jurisdictions, the National
Historic Preservation Act,13 3 which allows for review by a state or certain
Native American tribes, potential access permits from the Bureau of Land
Management, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, State Land
Commissions and private land owners.134 If military facilities are
involved, there is another added layer of regulatory authority that must be
that will provide higher production with current refinery configurations .... However,
all of these are on the margin.").
129 See Mannix, supra note 28.
13 0 KUMINS, ET. AL., supra note 24, at 5, 9.
131 KuMINs, ET. AL., supra note 24, at 9.
132 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331-4344 (2006).
133 16 U.S.C. § 470 (2006), et seq.
134 McGinnis, supra note 42.
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involved in the siting process.' 35 Similar to other industrial projects, many
issues and agencies must be consulted when a new refinery is planned.
How those agencies cooperate (or choose not to cooperate) can decide the
fate of a refinery.
The largest concentration of the nation's refinery infrastructure is
located on the Gulf Coast.136 While the Gulf Coast is a good strategic
location for a refinery-with access to shipping channels-it is also a
location that has welcomed the industry in the past. 1 If the ACF project
is any indication, there is a significant lack of any "welcoming attitude"
toward new refinery projects. However, the current energy climate
indicates that local opposition groups may have less influence as the
public becomes more concerned about the needs for regional and national
energy needs. 138
Clearly, environmental regulation and siting issues are interwoven.
Even though the ACF project could be the "cleanest" refinery ever
built,'39 local opposition to the project can be skeptical of such a claim.'14 0
The refinery would produce California's own boutique fuel (California
RFG), thus supplying one of the nation's "tight" markets. 141 A refinery
built with more than thirty years of technological advancement over the
last refinery will surely have the benefit of new, more productive, and
environmentally sound technologies. If the ACF project is built,
environmentalists and the industry will scrutinize the actual effect of the
plant on the environment. Thus, it is in the industry's best interest to build
1 Id..
136See KUMINs & BAMBERGER, supra note 3, at 3.
137 PIRINC, supra note 19, at 1-2 ("To a certain extent, the concentration of refining and
natural gas processing and import capability is a natural result of the region's historic role
as the country's most important oil and gas producing area. But concentration also
reflects the opposition facing any company attempting to build facilities.").
13 BAMBERGER, supra note 58, at 5 ("Local opposition to new . .. refineries . .. is often
most effective during periods of price and supply stability, but sometimes eases only after
shortages have actually occurred.").
'
3 9 See Tammy Krikorian, EPA: No Objection to Refinery Permit, THE YUMA SUN, Mar.
22, 2005, at *1.
140 See Refinery Reform Campaign,
http://www.refineryreform.org/spotlightyumaaz.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2007).141 PIROG, supra note 76, at 16.
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the "cleanest" refinery-anything less will only ensure that the ACF
project will become the "last" refinery built for decades to come.
However, as the public becomes more concerned about regional
and national energy needs, it is more likely that the public will look to the
"solutions" of local opposition with a more skeptical eye. The ACF
project faced "stiff opposition from a local environmental group, which
argued that the first proposed location for the refinery was too close to an
urban area, while the second, a rural site, was too far. When queried about
an ideal location for the proposed oil refinery, the environmental group's
founder suggested Mexico."l 42 The local environment group, the Refinery
Reform Campaign, states that it is a "national campaign seeking to clean
up America's oil refineries and reduce our dependence on foreign oil."' 4 3
While reducing the nation's dependence is often cited as a
bipartisan goal, the effect of not having sufficient refinery capacity is that
the United States must import foreign refined products. Thus, preventing
the building of a domestic refinery will not advance the goal of reducing
dependence on foreign oil unless the underlying goal is to make gasoline
more expensive, thus curbing demand. However, when gasoline is
imported to make up for a lack of domestic capacity, the effect of limiting
domestic refinery capacity to increase prices for refined products is muted.
In addition, while building a refinery in Mexico is not necessarily contrary
to the goal of cleaning up America's oil refineries, that goal is not
advanced by having refineries built in foreign locations under the auspice
of foreign regulations. Considering that pollution knows no national
boundaries, the refinery capacity solution is not simply solved by shifting
refinery capacity south of the border in hopes that any pollution will not
affect the environment north of the border.
E. Increased Imports ofRefined Products is Not Compatible with the
Nation's Energy Policy
142 Walling, supra note 18 (citing John J. Fialka, Hurricanes May Energize Refinery Plan,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 23, 2005, at A4).
143 Refinery Reform Campaign, http://www.refineryreform.org (last visited May 23,
2007).
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Following the Hurricanes, EPA Administrator Stephen Johnson
invoked authority granted by Section 1541 of the EPAct,144 to issue a
series of limited fuel waivers for specific gasoline and diesel quality
standards because of supply concerns.1 45  The waiver facilitated the
transport of fuels domestically, as all U.S. gasoline markets were then
authorized to use European gasoline imports. In response to the domestic
situation, the International Energy Administration coordinated the release
of two million barrels per day of gasoline from Europe to the United
States for fifteen days.146  While the availability of European imports
helped to minimize the effect of a short-term supply shock, any long-term
response to domestic capacity issues requiring substantial imports would
4 See Letter from Stephen L. Johnson, Administrator, EPA, to Robert Riley, Governor
of Alabama (Aug. 31, 2005), available at
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/policies/civil/caa/mobile/katrina5Ostatewaiver.
pdf, see also EPAct § 1541, 119 Stat. 594 (2005) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §
7545(c)(4)(C)(ii) (2006)).
145 Id. § 1541(c)(4)(C)(ii) provides that the EPA Administrator, in consultation with the
DOE, may waive the requirements for boutique fuels if:
(I) extreme and unusual fuel or fuel additive supply circumstances exist
in a State or region of the Nation which prevent the distribution of an
adequate supply of the fuel or fuel additive to consumers;
(II) such extreme and unusual fuel and fuel additive supply
circumstances are the result of a natural disaster, an Act of God, a
pipeline or refinery equipment failure, or another event that could not
reasonably have been foreseen or prevented and not the lack of prudent
planning on the part of the suppliers of the fuel or fuel additive to such
State or region; and
(III) it is in the public interest to grant the waiver (for example, when a
waiver is necessary to meet projected temporary shortfalls in the supply
of the fuel or fuel additive in a State or region of the Nation which
cannot otherwise be compensated for).
If the EPA administrator and DOE concur on the need to waive boutique fuel standards, a
waiver will be permitted only if: (1) It applies to the "smallest geographical area"
necessary to address the circumstances, (2) it is effective for no more than twenty
calendar days, (3) it permits a "transitional period" after the "termination of the
temporary waiver to permit wholesalers and retailer to blend down their wholesale and
retail inventory, (4) the waiver applies to all persons in the fuel distribution system and
(5) the EPA Administrator has given public notice to all parties in the fuel distribution
s stem and local and state regulators, in the state or region covered by the waiver. Id.
KUMINs & BAMBERGER, supra note 3, at 5.
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require foreign refiners to either invest in technologies to bring their
refineries up to U.S. specifications, or for continued waivers of U.S.
specifications. Without such investment, the EPA Administrator will
likely be politically pressured to waive requirements if the volatility in
prices from certain shortfalls in specific boutique blends continues so that
the U.S. can meet its demand with imports. Some members of the
industry have argued that when waivers are granted as a politically
expedient means of satisfying the public, the waiver "penalizes" all
companies that have invested in technologies to meet mandated
requirements.147 Thus, such waivers that are likely to occur during times
of tightened supply are likely to penalize the companies that have made
investments that would prevent the negative effects of an overly tight
supply market.
Waivers may become increasingly necessary if foreign gasolines
are not produced in strict conformance to U.S. requirements. "[A]s U.S.
fuel quality specifications have become more stringent, some sources of
imported product have chosen not to invest to comply."l 48 For example,
gasoline from Brazil has "declined significantly in recent years."l 49
Although the "situation could reverse in the future," one must consider
that the cost of imported boutique fuels will likely increase to compensate
for the additional transportation expenses. However, as shown by
Europe's response to the Hurricanes, Western Europe has been able to
supply growing volumes of fuels.'5 0 European Union fuels are generally
higher quality, and thus similar to U.S. specifications.' 1 Similar,
however, does not mean that the fuels meet each region's mandate for
specific boutique fuels.
The need for waivers would most likely occur when demand for
refined products is at its peak-the summer. In fact, standards were again
relaxed in the spring of 2006 "in an effort to improve gasoline production
and ease distribution problems." 152 Thus, in two recent summers of high
demand for gasoline, the standards for boutique fuels have been relaxed
147 PETERSON & MAHNOVSKI, supra note 59, at 72.
148 EPA & DOE, supra note 21, at 17.
149 id
1so Id.
151 EPA & DOE, supra note 21, at 17.
152 BAMBERGER, supra note 58, at 10.
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out of production and distribution concerns. If this "politically expedient"
practice continues, then a trend may develop in which boutique fuel
standards are relaxed during the season in which they are designed
specifically to reduce air pollution. While it is sometimes the "politically
expedient" solution to relax boutique fuel standards during a supply
crunch, the long-term solution is to develop a system that is more
compatible with the national refinery and distribution network.
III. REGULATION AND LEGISLATION
Refinery capacity was one aspect of energy policy addressed in the
EPAct.153  Despite the provisions in the EPAct, more comprehensive
legislation was advanced to promote refinery expansion almost as soon as
the EPAct was enacted into law. Similar to the status quo consideration of
how regulations affect the refinery inspection, the proposed legislation
was as haphazard as the current boutique fuel system.
A. Energy Policy Act of2005
In August of 2005, Congress attempted to provide the nation with a
"strategic" energy plan: the EPAct. 154 The EPAct, which began in 2001,
"is the first omnibus energy legislation enacted by Congress in thirteen
years. In terms of scope and impact, the 1700 page bill is the most
ambitious legislation since a package of bills passed during the
administration of President Carter." 155 Prior to the EPAct, the last explicit
energy bill was passed in 1992 immediately following the first Gulf
War. 156
153 Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L.109-58, title III, subtitle H, 119 Stat. 594 (2005)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 15951-52 (2006)).
154 Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (2005).
55 Report, Legislation Committee, ENERGY L.J. 349, 349 (2006) (footnote omitted); see
BAMBERGER, supra note 58, at 1 (stating that the "passage of the EPAct had its roots in
an unexpected jump in oil prices that began in the late spring of 1999, following a




In terms of refinery capacity, the EPAct subscribed Title III,
Subtitle H, "Refinery Revitalization," to address refinery capacity.
Subtitle H provided the groundwork for federal-state coordination for
permitting requirements: "At the request of the Governor of a State, the
Administrator [of the EPA] may enter into a refinery permitting
cooperative agreement with the State, under which each party to the
agreement identifies steps, including timelines, that it will take to
streamline the consideration of Federal and State environmental permits
for a new refinery." 5 8
In addressing the proliferation of boutique fuels, the EPAct
contains three key provisions.15 9 First, the EPAct eliminated an oxygenate
standard for RFG.160  Second, the EPAct eliminated the distinction
between summertime RFG in the northern and southern United States.'61
Third, the EPAct also required the "EPA to publish a boutique fuels list
based on fuels in the market as of September 1, 2004."162 On June 6,
2006, the EPA published a draft listing of boutique fuels.' 63  After
publishing the list, "states seeking approval of new fuel programs
generally would be limited to fuel ty es already in existence within the
PADD in which the state is located."'
Because of changes implemented in the EPAct, the EPA may only
approve a new state fuel program if (1) the fuel is already approved in a
SIP for a state in its respective PADD, (2) "the approval does not increase
the total number of state fuels on EPA's list of fuels," and (3) if a "new
fuel is added to the list, EPA with DOE consultation must find no adverse
impact on supply and distribution."l 65 In addition, Section 1509 of the
EPAct requires the EPA and the DOE to prepare a report by June 1, 2008,
157 Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L.109-58, title III, subtitle H, 119 Stat. 594 (codified
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 15951-52 (2006)).158 id.
'59 YACOBUCCI, supra note 98, at 12.
160 Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-58 § 1504(a), 119 Stat. 1076 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 7545 (2006)).
i6' Id. § 1504(c).
162 EPA, supra note 108, at 12.
163 Draft Boutique Fuels List Under Section 1541(b) of the Energy Policy Act, 71 Fed.
Reg. 32, 532-02 (June 6, 2006).
'6 EPA & DOE, supra note 21, at 14.
165 EPA, supra note 108, at 12-13.
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called the "Fuel System Requirements Harmonization Study," to study and
account for "recent and anticipated changes in the U.S. gasoline and fuels
supply and distribution market." 66  Section 1541 grants the EPA
Administrator broader authority to grant waivers for federally enforceable
fuel regulations. 6 7  Authority under Section 1541 allowed the EPA to
waive fuel standards following the Hurricanes and during the spring
months of 2006.168
The EPAct's provisions for refinery revitalization are small steps
in the right direction for regulating refineries within a national energy
policy dynamic. With a variety of fuels with different properties, states
can still choose to mandate a fuel to further a state's environmental goals
in accordance with national standards. However, instead of simply
considering the effects of a state's mandate on the state itself, the EPAct
forces states to pick from a list that will control the national proliferation
of fuels. This measure thus adds more certainty to refiners, who now will
better understand the breadth and potential expansion of certain boutique
fuel markets. Refiners who were less likely to invest in technologies to
make a certain boutique fuel blend are now reassured that the market for
such fuels will not become further fragmented by any additional mandates.
Concerning the federal-state coordination provisions, the EPAct
recognizes that the complexities of federal, state, and local regulations
require increased cooperation among all levels of regulatory agencies.
However, the EPAct requires a backwards approach to increase
coordination. Under the EPAct, investors interested in siting a new
refinery must first consider a site and then contact someone in the
Governor's office of a state where the proposed refinery is located.
Similar to how states were unlikely to consider the benefits and costs of
mandating an additional boutique fuel within a national energy
framework, a state's Governor's office is unlikely to consider the national
benefits and costs of a proposed refiner's plan. Thus, again state and local
interests will override national energy needs. In addition, even if a
Governor was interested in entering into an agreement with the EPA
Administrator to create an arrangement to streamline the permitting of a
66EPA, supra note 108, at 13.
67 Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-58 § 1541, 119 Stat. 1107 (2005).
168 See BAMBERGER, supra note 58, at 10.
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refinery, there is an increased possibility that the weight of local
opposition groups could derail such a plan. The refinery situation is one
of national concern, and greater federal control is needed to address the
situation than is provided in the EPAct.
B. Post-Katrina Legislative Proposals
The Hurricanes put additional pressure on domestic markets for
refined products after the immediate enactment of the EPAct, 169 which
prompted some legislators to propose more dynamic legislation to address
the refinery capacity situation. The proposed legislation demonstrated a
lack of satisfaction over the provisions of the EPAct regarding refinery
capacity. However, none of the proposals passed both the House and the
Senate because of partisan disagreement on what would be the most
effective means to address the refinery capacity situation.
1. Federal Agency Control
Some legislators advocated for more federal control over the
refinery permitting process.
The Refinery Permit Process Schedule Act ("RPPSA") "[d]irects the
President to appoint a Federal coordinator to manage the multi-agency
permitting process," gives the EPA priority in scheduling coordination,
and repeals the federal-state cooperation program set forth in the
"Refinery Revitalization" subtitle of the EPAct, among other
provisions.170 Advocates of the bill stated that it "includes measures to
simplify and expedite the refinery permitting processes while maintaining
strong environmental standards,"' 7 while opponents of the bill stated that
169 BAMBERGER, supra note 58, at 1.
170 Refinery Permit Process Schedule Act, H.R. 5254, 109th Cong. § 4, 7 (2005); see also
Fuel Supply Improvement Act of 2005, H.R. 3836, 109th Cong. § 3 (2005) (listing
similar permitting provisions).
171 Refinery Permit Process: Hearing on H.R. 5254 Before the S. Comm. Energy and
Natural Resources, 109th Cong (2006) (statement of Bob Meyers, Associate Assistant
Administrator, Air and Radiation, Environmental Protection Agency)
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any such "streamlining" measure failed to recognize that the lack of
refinery capacity growth was solely because of oil companies' "own
economic projections."l 72  In a similar proposal, the "Gasoline for
America's Security Act of 2005,"173 proposed that the DOE should be
designated as the lead federal agency in charge of managing the multi-
agency permitting process for refineries.
Because refinery capacity is an integral part of the nation's future
energy policy, it should be controlled by a Federal agency, as was
proposed in RPPSA. Specifically, the DOE is the appropriate Federal
agency that has the expertise to coordinate permitting and regulations for
refineries. A federal agency can alleviate the problems inherent to state
control over a national problem: States only consider the in-state costs and
benefits of regulation.' 74 As demonstrated by the cooperation of the DOE
and the EPA in' promulgating a report detailing the interwoven
environmental and energy supply effects of boutique fuels,' 7 5 these two
agencies need to consult in the future so that the federal needs of a clean
environment are considered on par with the nation's energy needs. The
DOE has demonstrated its competence and ability to work with agencies
such as the EPA to achieve mutual goals. By designating a federal agency
to control the refinery permit process, the regulatory framework will
reflect that domestic refinery capacity is a significant issue of national
concern, and that it is necessary to continue the national boutique fuels
program. This idea is nothing new. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission
("NRC") 7 6 and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC") '77
172 Id. (statement of Rep. Betty McCollum).
' H.R. 3893, 109th Cong. § 102(b) (2005).
174 Pierce, supra note 40, at 184.
175 See EPA & DOE, supra note 21.
176 "The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission is an independent agency established by
the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 to regulate civilian use of nuclear materials."
About NRC, http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2007).
1n FERC is an independent agency that regulates the interstate transmission of electricity,
natural gas, and oil. FERC also reviews proposals to build liquefied natural gas terminals
and interstate natural gas pipelines as well as licensing hydropower projects. What FERC
Does, http://www.ferc.gov/about/ferc-does.asp (last visited Mar. 6, 2007).
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have both been able to exert federal control over energy related
industries. 78
Although national coordination of the permitting processes is not a
cure-all solution that can address all of the many factors that affect
refinery capacity decisions, it is something that the legislature can affect
and can make for a more efficient process. As shown by the ACF project,
strung out permitting can have a material affect on whether a refinery can
be built in a reasonable amount of time. Further, national coordination
does not mean that any type of regulation is "relaxed." Simply, if one
agency is able to determine that a standard is met, there is no added
benefit to have a requirement that another agency expend resources to
make a similar determination. As a lead agency to balance and coordinate
national, state, and local interests, the DOE will able to better control and
make appropriate recommendations regarding the use of boutique fuels
and refinery siting concerns in cooperation with the EPA.
2. Boutique Fuels
The EPAct greatly curbed the ability of states to continue the
proliferation of boutique fuels. Over the long term, it may be in the
interest of a national fuel program to "harmonize" the number of boutique
fuels,'7 9 as was proposed in the "Gasoline for America's Security Act of
2005.180 However, any effort to harmonize fuels in the short term could
have the same effect on refinery production and distribution as the
proliferation of fuels as refiners modified their facilities to meet the new
"harmonized" standard". 181 . However, in the long run, the
harmonization of fuel standards will lead to long term regulatory stability
in the refinery industry, and could encourage capital expenditures on
increased refinery capacity expansion, as opposed to using capital to
comply with ever changing fuel requirements. Further, with a harmonized
fuels list, the industry will be more likely to increase capacity because of
178 See Gasoline for America's Security Act of 2005, H.R. 3893, 109th Cong. § 2(9),
(2005) (listing comparisons to NRC and FERC).
79 YACOBUCCI, supra note 98, at 1.
180 Gasoline for America's Security Act of 2005, H.R. 3893, 109th Cong. § 108 (2005).
181 YACOBUCCI, supra note 98, at 10.
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the increased fungibility of harmonized fuels. With broader markets, there
will be greater incentive to supply the larger market with more capacity.
It is in the environmental interest to develop a boutique fuel
program that is compatible with domestic refinery capabilities. As
demonstrated by the EPA Administrator's response to the Hurricanes,
when a supply shock leads to a sharp shock in prices for gasoline, often an
"outraged" Congress calls for government interventionl 82 . After the
Hurricanes, one way the executive responded was by suspending the EPA
requirements for boutique fuels.'8 3 Again, standards were suspended in
the spring of 2006.184 This led to greater mobility of fuels from all
refiners across the country, and the ability of the United States to import
European gasoline that may not otherwise have met the boutique fuel
requirements. It is likely that the public would call for a similar response
to any future supply shock. There is a possibility that the boutique fuel
system will be unable to achieve its goals of sustaining lower pollution
levels if there is a call for a suspension of the requirements whenever a
supply shock shifts the public and government's perception of the tradeoff
between perceived environmental benefits and that of higher energy
prices.
3. Siting Proposals
Some legislation has suggested that the federal government can
address problems associated with local opposition groups and the not-in-
my-backyard ("NIMBY") syndrome' 8 5 by simply making largely unused
federal lands available for oil refinery construction. Several bills call for
182 See, e.g., Steven Mufson & Shailagh Murray, Profits, Prices Spur Oil Outrage, WASH.
PosT, Apr. 28, 2006, at AOl (stating that after ExxonMobil reported a first quarter profit
of $8.4 billon for the 2006 fiscal year, "members of Congress outraged over high gasoline
prices hastened to propose measures that would boost taxes on oil firms, open new areas
to drilling and provide rebates to taxpayers but would not necessarily alter prices at the
pumps.").
1 KUMHINs & BAMBERGER, supra note 3, at 7.
18 BAMBERGER, supra note 58, at 10.
185 See, e.g., Walling, supra note 142.
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the federal designation of closed military bases' 86  for refinery
construction, while others call for the Secretary of Energy to facilitate the
construction of a "Refinery Strategic Reserve."' 8 7
While both proposals recognize that siting considerations are an
integral factor that will influence refinery construction, they are both
flawed in their own ways. Regarding the use of closed military
installations, the refinery industry is not looking for anywhere to build a
refinery; the industry is looking for an economically suitable location to
build a refinery. Economically suitable locations have access to shipping
channels. 8 8  If a refinery is built in a location that does not provide
channels for shipping crude oil to the refinery or gasoline to retail
destinations, then capital-intensive infrastructure, such as pipelines, must
also be built. Considering that refineries already require intensive capital
investment, it is unlikely that it would be feasible for the industry to make
an investment decision to build a refinery and for a new pipeline. Thus,
the plan to build refineries on federal lands will not materially help the
industry.
The proposal to build a Refinery Strategic Reserve would
contribute to the already difficult siting problems that plague the
construction of a refinery. If NIMBY opponents do not desire a nearby
refinery, it is unlikely that such groups would desire a massive land
intensive structure of oil tanks and its accompanying infrastructure.
Further, with eighteen gasoline formulations, it is questionable that any
type of reserve would be remotely compatible with the nationwide system
of boutique fuels. Thus, any use of a Refinery Strategic Reserve would
occur after the waiver of EPA fuel requirements. In effect, the Refinery
Strategic Reserve would only substitute for imports of refined products.
The Refinery Strategic Reserve solution is not viable as a means to solve
the nation's disjointed refinery policy. In summation, the siting proposals
recognize that additional refineries require land, but they do not recognize
186 Gasoline for America's Security Act of 2005, H.R. 3893, 109th Cong. § 101(b)(1)(G)
(2005); see generally Randall S. Beach, Swords to Plowshares: Recycling Cold War
Installations, 15 PROB. & PROP. 58 (2001) (detailing history and processes of the Base
Realignment and Closure Commission, which is responsible for closing military
installations).
187 H.R. 5365, 109th Cong. (2005); S. 1979, 109th Cong. (2005).
188 PIRINC, supra notel9, at 1-2.
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that refineries will not be built where they could be built, but rather, where
they should be built.
Although legislators have proposed creative "solutions" to the
nation's tightened refinery capacity, no one solution is likely to have a
significant effect on increasing refinery capacity. The industry is
complex, and there are a host of factors that enter into the investment
calculus of whether to increase domestic capacity. What legislators need
to consider is that the national prerogative in the nation's refinery
infrastructure is not currently being represented in the host of regulatory
proposals that ultimately affect the industry.
IV. THE NEED FOR LEGISLATIVE COHERENCE AND A LEAD FEDERAL
AGENCY
The current refinery situation is not the result of any
comprehensive plan by the industry, the government, or the public.
Instead, the current situation follows from a lack of planning and a lack of
consideration on how many individual regulations have in the aggregate
created a situation that has helped form a de facto moratorium on refinery
construction. This result is partly caused by the de facto designation of the
EPA as the lead agency in handling refinery capacity by means of the
EPA's authority over the boutique fuel program. However, the EPA is not
charged with handling the national concerns of the nation's energy
capacity. It is not in the interest of the nation, consumers, or
environmentalists for the current situation to remain at the status quo.
The current national problem needs to be addressed with
leadership at the national level. Thus, it is prudent designate the DOE as
the lead federal agency to coordinate industry regulation. The DOE would
(1) become a point of contact between the industry and the government,
(2) would provide a unified government voice that could voice its
concerns over proposed regulation that may adversely affect the industry,
and (3) would offer a different voice aside from the industry to educate
communities about the costs and benefits of refineries. The DOE is better
equipped to work with the industry to ensure that capacity expansions can
feasibly occur in locations that are economically suitable for refinery
expansion. The current situation is unsustainable: either environmental
regulations will be relaxed de jure because of the incapability of the
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current system in a future of rising demand for refined products, or de
facto when regulations are relaxed as a politically expedient measure to
satisfy short term supply disruptions. The designation of the DOE as a
lead agency to handle the permitting and siting of refineries is a modest
step to improve one critical factor that determines refinery capacity.
While such a measure will not lead to instantaneous capacity expansion, it
will clear one hurdle that would otherwise prohibit expansion even when
the other factors that are critical for refinery expansion are favorable.
Under the control of the DOE, federal energy and environmental
policy can be considered synonymously. If such action was taken in the
past, the nation would unlikely have eighteen different fuel types.
Accordingly, under DOE leadership, the moratorium on the proliferation
of fuel types as set forth in the EPAct needs to continue. A federal fuels
list maintained by the DOE would give greater assurance to investors that
they could invest in technologies to make current blends. In addition, the
DOE as a lead federal agency could help bring about a regionalized fuel
system that would be more compatible with a federal fuel program.' 89
The designation of the DOE as a lead federal agency to handle refinery
capacity concerns may not have an immediate or dramatic effect on the
industry, which is inherently an industry of uncertainty that must consider
future product demand and technology. However, it will help alleviate the
burden of the current situation that does not adequately serve national or
local government, the public, or environmental concerns.
V. CONCLUSION
The legislature, agencies of the executive branch, industry, and the
public have voiced concern over the nation's refinery capacity. However,
there was no politically practical solution proposed during the 109th
Congress. Robert Pirog of the Congressional Research Service concluded
in a report analyzing oil industry profits that "[h]istorically volatile prices
and profit levels coupled with a tight regulatory environment contribute to
industry uncertainty." 90  While uncertainty may help Wall Street
"insiders" earn profits, uncertainty when tying up billions of dollars of
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capital in a refinery simply stifles investment. If the U.S. fails to have
adequate refining infrastructure as demand increases in the near future, the
U.S. will have to import more refined products. Imports are unlikely to
meet the requirements for all of the U.S.'s unique fuel mandates. While
the government has only indirect effect on oil and gasoline prices, it
controls the industry regulatory framework. Regulations do not
necessarily have to be "loosened" to create a more comprehensive
environmental and energy policy that affects refineries, but a more
systematic approach to the regulatory environment of the refining industry
may quall some of roadblocks regulation poses for refinery capacity
expansion. The designation of the DOE as a lead federal agency to handle
domestic refinery capacity is a simple, yet essential first step to configure
domestic refinery capacity within national energy and environmental
policies. Even a slightly more certain regulatory environmental policy has
the possibility of encouraging the oil industry, which currently has
investment capital, to invest in domestic refining infrastructure.
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